

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal
State of Louisiana

No. 26-K-266

STATE OF LOUISIANA

versus

SARAH TYNER

IN RE STATE OF LOUISIANA
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE
NANCY A. MILLER, DIVISION "I", No. 25-4673

TRUE COPY

July 27, 2026



LINDA TRAN
DEPUTY CLERK

Panel composed of Judges Stephen J. Windhorst,
Michael P. Mentz, Pro Tempore, and Timothy S. Marcel

WRIT DENIED; STAY DENIED

The State of Louisiana seeks review of the trial court’s May 18, 2026 judgment granting defendant’s motion to quash the Georgia predicate conviction. The State subsequently filed a motion for stay. For the following reasons, we deny the motion for stay and this writ application.

Procedural History

Case number 24-6178

On December 12, 2024, in case number 24-6178, defendant, Sarah Tyner, was charged by bill of information with one count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, fourth offense, in violation of La. R.S. 14:98 A and La. R.S. 14:98.4 A, with the State charging three out-of-state convictions as the predicate offenses (*i.e.*,

a trial in Mississippi and two guilty pleas from Alabama and Georgia). State v. Tyner, 25-350 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/17/25), 420 So.3d 833, 836.

On May 23, 2025, defendant filed a motion to quash the three predicate offenses, arguing that (1) the three predicate convictions were not supported by waiver of rights forms or colloquies; (2) the prior pleas were unconstitutionally accepted; and (3) requested that the DWI fourth-offense charge be quashed. Tyner, 837. The State filed an opposition and attached certified documentation from the three predicate cases, which were formally introduced at the hearing. Id.

On July 10, 2025, at the motion to quash hearing, defense counsel sought to quash the two convictions from Alabama and Georgia, asserting there was no Boykin¹ form, colloquy, or minute entry showing that defendant was advised of her rights and waived them. Id. Counsel indicated that although there were attorneys of record in both cases, because they did not sign anything, it was unclear whether they were present on the days the purported pleas took place. Id. Counsel claimed that the State's exhibits were sentencing orders and did not provide evidence of a waiver of defendant's rights. Id. Counsel asserted that the Alabama and Georgia convictions should be quashed because there was nothing to support them. Id. The State argued that its exhibits established that defendant was represented by counsel when the Alabama and Georgia pleas were taken and that it had met its initial burden, requiring defendant to show any infringement of rights or irregularity. The State maintained that the defense offered no affirmative evidence to the contrary. Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the motion under advisement. Id.

On July 16, 2025, the trial court issued a written judgment denying the motion to quash, finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish the existence of the three predicate convictions listed in the bill of information. Id. As

¹ Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

to the two guilty pleas from Alabama and Georgia, the trial court found that the defense failed to offer affirmative evidence demonstrating that the pleas were constitutionally deficient. Id.

Defendant filed a writ application and a request for a stay with this court, arguing that the records from the Alabama and Georgia convictions did not contain a waiver of rights form, a transcript of colloquy with the judge, or a minute entry reflecting that she was advised of and waived her constitutional rights. Id. at 836. Defendant contended that the only documents produced were sentencing orders, which did not state that she was informed of her rights or that she waived them.² Id. The State filed an opposition, arguing that the evidence submitted was sufficient to satisfy its burden. Id.

On September 17, 2025, this court denied the writ application in part, as to the trial court's denial of the motion to quash the Alabama predicate conviction, and granted the writ application in part, as to the trial court's denial of the motion to quash the Georgia predicate conviction. Id. Based on the documents submitted by the State, this court found that the State met its initial burden of proving the existence of the Georgia predicate conviction. Id. at 841. However, this court further found that although the Waiver of Arraignment and Notice of Appearance reflected that defendant was represented by counsel approximately a month earlier on June 21, 2019, nothing in the July 23, 2019 plea order referenced counsel or otherwise confirmed in any way that defendant was represented by counsel when the plea was taken on July 23, 2019. Id. Consequently, this court concluded that the State's evidence did not establish that defendant was represented by counsel at the time the Georgia predicate guilty plea was taken. Id. Finding that the trial court erred by shifting the burden to defendant to produce affirmative evidence showing an

² In that writ application, defendant did not challenge the trial court's refusal to quash the Mississippi predicate conviction. Tyner, 420 So.3d at 836.

infringement of her rights or a procedural irregularity in the taking of the Georgia plea, this court reversed the trial court's ruling as to the Georgia predicate conviction, granted the motion to quash as to the Georgia conviction, denied defendant's request for a stay, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. The result of this court's ruling was to effectively reduce defendant's charge to a Third Offense DWI. The State in its brief admits to this court that it chose not to seek supervisory review of this ruling with the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Instead, on October 14, 2025, the State filed a motion to reopen quashal proceedings with additional documentation/opposition to motion to quash, raising similar arguments to its original opposition to the motion to quash. The State argued that defendant's motion to quash was rooted in the mistaken understanding of who bears the burden and should be denied. The State asserted that it obtained new documentation to cure a defect highlighted by a higher court and attached certified documentation from the three predicate cases, including a newly obtained Georgia document, an "Affidavit of Defendant Prior to Entering Plea." The State asserted that the newly obtained certified copy of "Affidavit of Defendant Prior to Entering Plea" shows that defendant was advised of her rights and contains the endorsement and bar roll number of her counsel on the form from the date of her Georgia plea. The State in its motion to reopen did not request an evidentiary hearing.

On October 16, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying the State's motion to reopen the motion to quash. The trial court's judgment pointed out that the State did not request a hearing, and the motion was taken up on the pleadings. The judgment then explained the procedural history of the case and provided the following:

The State now moves to reopen the defendant's Motion to Quash so that it may submit additional evidence to cure the deficiency noted by the Court of Appeal. The State provides no legal authority to support the "reopening" of a motion [to] quash. Nor does the State provide any explanation for why its new "additional documentation" could not have

been submitted at the Motion to Quash hearing, which was taken up approximately seven weeks after the Motion to Quash was filed. The motion was submitted, ruled upon, reviewed by the appellate court, and is now the law of the case.

The State, in its brief to this court, acknowledged that it chose not to seek supervisory review of the trial court's judgment denying its motion to reopen.

Case number 25-4673

While case number 24-6178 was pending, on October 27, 2025, the State filed a new bill of information charging defendant with one count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, fourth offense, in violation of La. R.S. 14:98(A) and La. R.S. 14:98.4(A), in district court case number 25-4673. The bill of information contained the same three predicate offenses originally alleged in case number 24-6178, with additional clarifying language that the Mississippi conviction followed a trial and the Alabama and Georgia convictions were based on counseled guilty pleas.

Thereafter, on January 29, 2026, in case number 24-6178, the State entered a *nolle prosequi* of the charge against defendant.

On March 25, 2026, in case number 25-4673, defense counsel filed a motion to quash bill of information, seeking to quash the Georgia predicate conviction. She argued that the State failed to present sufficient proof of the Georgia conviction and that its reinstitution of the charge constituted an impermissible attempt to circumvent prior judicial rulings in violation of due process, fundamental fairness, and the principles set forth in State v. Reimonenq, 19-367 (La. 10/22/19), 286 So.3d 412. Defendant pointed out that after this court held that the State's proof regarding the Georgia conviction was insufficient and the trial court denied the State's motion to reopen the quashal proceedings, the State improperly filed a new bill of information, rather than seeking review of that ruling, in an effort to cure the evidentiary deficiency. Defendant characterized the State's actions as an improper "do-over" designed to circumvent the trial court and this court's prior adverse rulings.

Defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the State's newly submitted "Affidavit of Defendant Prior to Entering a Plea," arguing that it did not establish that she was represented by counsel at the time of the July 23, 2019 Georgia guilty plea. She contended that the affidavit (1) did not demonstrate counsel's presence or participation in the plea proceedings; (2) contained case numbers that differed from the other Georgia documents; and (3) was unsupported by additional evidence establishing representation by counsel or a valid waiver thereof.

The State filed an opposition, arguing that the newly obtained Georgia documentation, an "Affidavit of Defendant Prior to Entering a Plea," (1) established that defendant was represented by counsel at the time of her July 23, 2019 guilty plea; (2) was obtained from defendant's former counsel; (3) bears counsel's name and bar roll number; (4) advises defendant of her rights prior to entering the plea; (5) is dated with date of the plea; and (6) is signed by both defendant and the judge.³ When considered together with the previously obtained Georgia documents, the State contended that the affidavit demonstrated that defendant was represented by counsel and was sufficient to satisfy the State's burden regarding the Georgia predicate conviction.

The State further argued that unlike in Reimonenq, where evidence was excluded due to the State's failure to comply with procedural requirements, the State here obtained additional evidence after this court held that the Georgia predicate conviction evidence was insufficient. The State asserted that after the trial court denied its motion to reopen the quashal proceedings, it dismissed the prior bill of information and instituted a new fourth-offense DWI charge based on the newly discovered evidence. The State maintained that it did not improperly circumvent

³ Upon review of the affidavit, we note that in the middle of the document, handwritten, is "Steven Miller #141937," which is followed by an illegible signature that does not appear to match the printed name or Mr. Miller's signature as shown on other documents submitted. In its brief to this court, the State alleges that it obtained this affidavit from defendant's prior counsel and it shows that "he did in fact represent the defendant at the time of the Georgia predicate plea."

prior rulings but merely sought to proceed with evidence that was not previously available. The State additionally argued that quashing the charge would improperly prevent prosecution for fourth-offense DWI based on a deficiency it later cured through newly discovered evidence and that no constitutional speedy trial violation occurred. The State attached certified documentation relating to the Georgia conviction.

On May 18, 2026, following submission of the motion to quash “on the written filings,” the trial court granted defendant’s motion to quash the Georgia predicate conviction. The State objected for the record and orally noticed its intent to seek supervisory review. The same day, the trial court issued a written judgment granting the motion to quash the Georgia predicate conviction after explaining the procedural history of the case and upon:

[f]inding that the State’s reinstitution of charges constitutes an impermissible attempt to avoid this Court’s prior ruling, and finding no justification for the State’s failure to submit the evidence now presented in case No. 24-6178[.]

The State filed this timely writ application.

Law and Analysis

In this writ application, the State challenges the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to quash as to the Georgia predicate conviction, which effectively reduces the charge to a DWI third offense. The State argues that Reimonenq, cited by defendant, is distinguishable from the facts of this case. The State argues that it did not dismiss and reinstitute charges to evade an adverse evidentiary ruling or to obtain an improper continuance. Instead, the State contends that after this court held the Georgia predicate conviction was insufficiently supported, the State obtained additional evidence and reinstituted the charge. The State argues that this case is more analogous to State v. King, 10-2638 (La. 5/6/11), 60 So.3d 615 (*per curiam*); State v. Batiste, 05-1571 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So.2d 1245;

and State v. Love, 00-3347 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So.2d 1198), where dismissal and reinstitution due to missing evidence did not warrant quashal. Further, the State asserts that the newly obtained Georgia plea affidavit, together with the previously submitted Georgia documents, cures the deficiency previously identified by this court regarding proof that defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the plea. Accordingly, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion to quash.

On September 17, 2025, in Tyner, this court found that the State failed to establish that defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the July 23, 2019 Georgia plea and reversed the trial court's ruling as to that predicate conviction and remanded the matter for further proceedings. 420 So.3d at 836. The State did not seek supervisory review of this court's ruling. Thereafter, the State obtained additional Georgia documentation (*i.e.*, "Affidavit of Defendant Prior to Entering Plea"), and almost one month later, on October 14, 2025, the State filed a motion to reopen the prior motion to quash proceeding. The trial court denied the State's motion to reopen. The State did not seek supervisory review of the trial court's ruling denying its motion to reopen. Instead, the State instituted the present fourth-offense DWI charge in case number 25-4673 and dismissed the original bill of information in 24-6178. The instant motion to quash the Georgia predicate conviction in case number 25-4673 followed.

A motion to quash can be employed to attack the constitutionality of prior convictions used to enhance a DWI charge. Id. at 838. A trial court's ruling on a motion to quash should not generally be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id. citing State v. Agreggaard, No. 22-82, 2022 WL819172 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/18/22), writs denied, 22-605 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 641, and 22-642 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So.3d 645).

District attorneys are imbued with vast authority over criminal prosecutions—they alone determine whom, when, and how they shall prosecute and may dismiss an indictment or a count in an indictment at their discretion without leave of court. See La. Const. art. V, § 26(B); La. C.Cr.P. art. 61. Indeed, they alone determine whether to dismiss a case. Reimonenq, 286 So.3d at 415. See also La. C.Cr.P. art. 691. The effect of a dismissal, or *nolle prosequi*, is to discharge the particular indictment, bill of information, or affidavit; however, it does not bar further prosecution if it is entered before the first witness is sworn. La. C.Cr.P. arts. 691, 693; State v. Norwood, 351 So.2d 122, 124 (La. 1977). However, a district attorney’s exercise of this power cannot impinge on the accused’s right to a speedy trial because that right is “‘fundamental’ and is imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the States.” Reimonenq, 286 So.3d at 415.

The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that it has primarily explored the limits of the trial court’s ability to dismiss and reinstitute criminal charges through the speedy trial lens, or more generally, the delay caused when a district attorney dismisses charges in response to a denied request for continuance. Id. at 415, citing King, 60 So.3d 615; Batiste, 939 So.2d 1245; and Love, 847 So.2d 1198.

In Love, the State entered an order of *nolle prosequi* after the State’s witness suffered a heart attack during *voir dire* and the trial court denied the State’s request for a continuance when the witness was unavailable again two months later. 847 So.2d at 1202. The State subsequently reinstituted the charges and defendant filed a motion to quash, asserting that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated and he was prejudiced by the State’s action. Id. at 1203. The trial court denied the motion to quash. Id. The court of appeal found the trial court should have granted the motion to quash and vacated defendant’s conviction and sentence. Id. at 1202.

Upon finding that the record as whole did not show that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial was violated by the State's action, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstated the defendant's conviction and sentence. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the unavailability of a State witness was a legitimate reason for delaying trial under the speedy trial clause; (2) the record supported the trial court's decision to deny the State's motion for continuance based on the unavailability of the State's witness for valid medical reasons based on the State's failure to meet the formal requirements for seeking a continuance under La. C.Cr.P. art. 707 and 709;⁴ (3) the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's motion to quash; and (4) a 22-month delay in prosecuting the defendant was presumptively prejudicial; but the defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated. Id. at 1204-1213. Under the circumstances presented in Love, the supreme court found that "the State did not seek an unfair advantage over the defendant." Id. at 1208.

In Batiste, the State entered an order of *nolle prosequi* on the date of trial because the victim was not present and was wavering in her commitment to going forward with her testimony in the case. 939 So.2d at 1249, 1251. The State dismissed the prosecution without requesting a continuance. Id. at 1249. The State then reinstituted the charge against the defendant a month later. Id. at 1248. The defendant filed a motion to quash, asserting that he suffered a speedy trial violation. Id. The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash, and the court of appeal affirmed. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the court of appeal erred when it found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to quash. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that "there was a legitimate reason for the *nolle prosequi* in this case," and "the record reveal[ed] no intentional delay on the State's

⁴ In Love, the ruling before the supreme court was the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to quash, not its denial of the State's motion for continuance. Id. at 1208.

part for the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage.” Id. at 1249-1250. The supreme court found that there was “no indication the district attorney was flaunting his authority at the expense of the defendant....” Id. at 1249. The supreme court concluded that it was clear that the dismissal of the prosecution against the defendant was not for the purpose of avoiding the time limitation for commencement of trial. Id. at 1250.

In King, the trial court denied the State’s second request for a continuance after a bank failed to comply with a subpoena for records. 60 So.3d at 617. The State immediately entered an order of *nolle prosequi* and then subsequently reinstituted charges. Id. The defendant filed a motion to quash, arguing that the State circumvented the trial court’s authority under La. C.Cr.P. art. 17 to manage its own docket.⁵ Id. The trial court granted the motion to quash. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that the state abused its discretion by dismissing the original bill of information and reinstituting charges a day later after the trial court denied its motion to continue the case at its second trial setting. Id. at 616. The appellate court relied on the trial court’s remarks in which the trial court stressed the State’s lack of preparation, not its one-continuance rule, in denying the continuance. Id. at 617. The court of appeal determined that given the trial court’s detailed reasons, the record supported the trial court’s finding that “the state flaunted its authority by granting itself a continuance” despite the trial court’s denial. Id. at 617-618.

In King, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that in situations where it is evident that the district attorney is flaunting his authority for a reasons that show that he wants to “favor the State at the expense of the defendant, such as putting the defendant at risk of losing witnesses, the trial court should grant a motion to quash,

⁵ In King, the trial court had an internal policy of allowing both sides one continuance only, as a means of managing its docket and encouraging the parties to prepare their cases for trial. Id. at 616.

and an appellate court can appropriately reverse a ruling denying a motion to quash in such a situation.” Id. at 618, quoting Love, 847 So.2d at 1209. The Supreme Court held that to the extent the defendant’s motion to quash did not assert violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights and did not claim any prejudice to his defense from the delay occasioned by the state’s dismissal and immediate reinstitution of the prosecution to force another continuance of trial, the trial court erred in granting the motion and dismissing the prosecution, reversed the ruling, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 620.

In Reimoneng, instead of applying for supervisory review of the trial court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion in limine and excluding its expert’s testimony based on the State’s untimely and deficient notice of its intent to call the expert at trial, the State entered a *nolle prosequi* and reinstituted charges against the defendant two days later. 286 So.3d at 414. Defendant filed a motion to quash. Id. The trial court denied the motion to quash. Id.

The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Reimoneng, found that the State’s dismissal and reinstitution of charges was distinguishable from the nature of those in King, Batiste, and Love, which involved “the absence of a witness or exhibit that was crucial to the [S]tate’s case.” Id. at 416. The supreme court found that the witness in Reimoneng could not be characterized as absent. Id. The witness’s testimony was excluded by the trial court because of the State’s failure to follow the applicable procedures and that the State not only gained a continuance but also evaded the trial court’s “wholly correct evidentiary ruling without ever seeking appellate review.” Id. The supreme court stated that while it recognized the State’s vast authority under La. C.Cr.P. art. 61 and 691, it “did not find that those articles permit the unfettered exercise of this authority to undermine the trial court proceedings and evade appellate review.” Id. Additionally, the supreme court pointed out that the State, in its brief, openly acknowledged it could have sought writs from the appellate court

but merely declined to do so. Id. at 418. The State suggested that dismissing and reinstituting these charges was simply “to put its case together.” Id. The supreme court found that the State’s exercise of its authority under La. C.Cr.P. art. 691 and 61 to dismiss and reinstitute charges against the defendant upset this “balance of forces” to such a degree that that it violated the defendant’s right to due process and fundamental fairness. Id. at 417. The supreme court found that “the [S]tate violated the defendant’s right to due process and fundamental fairness when it exercised its authority to dismiss and reinstitute a prosecution not only to gain a continuance, but to nullify a trial court’s correct evidentiary ruling....” Id. The supreme court concluded that “[b]ecause the actions of the state in this matter so undermine the authority of the trial court that it offends bedrock principles of fundamental fairness and due process, we reverse.” Id. at 413.

In State v. Williams, 21-205 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 317, 317, the State dismissed the charges against defendant during jury selection before the jury was sworn after the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to exclude a cell phone video that the State failed to authenticate. Id. The next day, the State reinstituted the charges against the defendant. Id. The defendant filed a motion to quash, which the trial court granted. Id. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to quash, the court of appeal reversed. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court found, as in Reimonenq, that the evidence was properly excluded by the trial court, and by using the vast authority provided by La. C.Cr.P. arts. 61 and 691, the State evaded the trial court’s evidentiary ruling without seeking appellate review. The supreme court found that, as in Reimonenq, the State’s exercise of its statutory right under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 61 and 691 to dismiss and reinstitute charges against defendant upset this “balance of forces” to such a degree that it violated the defendant’s right to due process and fundamental fairness. Id. Therefore, the supreme court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

the motion to quash, reversed the court of appeal's opinion, and reinstated the trial court's ruling. Id.

We find that the circumstances presented in this case are more analogous to Reimonenq and Williams than to Love, Batiste, and King. Although the State possesses broad authority to dismiss and reinstitute charges under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 61 and 691, “[i]nherent in justice and the concept of fundamental fairness is ensuring a ‘balance of forces between the accused and his accuser.’” Reimonenq, 286 So.3d at 417, quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973). Here, in case number 24-6178, instead of seeking supervisory review of this court's decision granting the motion to quash as to the Georgia predicate conviction, approximately a month later, the State filed a motion to reopen the motion to quash proceedings with the newly obtained affidavit. After the trial court denied the State's motion to reopen the prior proceedings, again the State chose not to seek review of the trial court's denial of its motion to reopen. The State then dismissed and reinstituted charges against defendant for DWI fourth offense, which included the previously excluded Georgia predicate conviction. Defendant's motion to quash in the reinstituted prosecution, case number 25-4673, which is at issue in this writ application, followed

As in Reimonenq and Williams, we find the State exercised its authority under La. C.Cr.P. arts. 61 and 691 to dismiss and reinstitute charges against defendant in a manner that effectively avoided the consequences of the prior adverse rulings of this court and the trial court concerning the Georgia predicate conviction without first attempting to seek supervisory review from the Louisiana Supreme Court or this court. Under these circumstances, the State's actions upset the “balance of forces between the accused and his accuser” to such a degree that they implicated defendant's right to due process and fundamental fairness. Accordingly, we find

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's motion to quash the Georgia predicate conviction in the current case number 25-4673.⁶

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the State's motion for stay and writ application are denied.

Gretna, Louisiana, this 27th day of July, 2026.

SJW
MPM
TSM

⁶ Although the State addresses the sufficiency of the newly submitted documentation relating to the Georgia predicate conviction, upon review, the trial court's written judgment does not address that issue. Instead, the judgment states that the trial court granted defendant's motion to quash based upon its determination that the State's dismissal and reinstitution of the prosecution constituted an impermissible attempt to avoid prior rulings concerning the Georgia predicate conviction. Therefore, we decline to address that issue.

SUSAN M. CHEHARDY
CHIEF JUDGE

FREDERICKA H. WICKER
JUDE G. GRAVOIS
MARC E. JOHNSON
STEPHEN J. WINDHORST
JOHN J. MOLAISSON, JR.
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NOTICE OF DISPOSITION CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE DISPOSITION IN THE FOREGOING MATTER HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH **UNIFORM RULES - COURT OF APPEAL, RULE 4-6** THIS DAY **07/27/2026** TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE TRIAL COURT CLERK OF COURT, AND AT LEAST ONE OF THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR EACH PARTY, AND TO EACH PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AS LISTED BELOW:

CURTIS B. PURSELL
CLERK OF COURT

26-K-266

E-NOTIFIED

24th Judicial District Court (Clerk)
Honorable Nancy A. Miller (DISTRICT JUDGE)
Thomas J. Butler (Relator)

Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr. (Relator)
Darren A. Allemand (Relator)

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